Conventional analysis often assumes that there are only two theoretical options for
calculating a reasonable royalty in patent disputes: a “pure ex ante” approach, under
which a court reconstructs the hypothetical bargain the parties would have struck prior to
infringement, based on the information available to them at that time; and a “pure ex
post” approach, under which the court considers the bargain the parties might have
reached as of some later date such as the date of judgment. The first approach avoids
patent holdup — basing the royalty partly on the infringer's sunk costs — but cannot
easily explain other longstanding features of how royalties are calculated, and can lead to
awards that reflect the parties’ erroneous ex ante expectations. By contrast, the pure ex
post approach uses more accurate information about the invention’s actual value, but it
also enables the patentee to capture some of the patent’s ex post holdup value. In this
Article, we show that a “contingent ex ante” framework, under which the court
reconstructs the bargain the parties would have reached ex ante, based on all relevant
information that is available ex post, is superior to both of the conventional approaches.
More specifically, our framework enables courts to base the royalty on the most accurate
information available of patent value while avoiding the holdup risk arising from the pure
ex post approach. We analyze how courts can apply our approach in various settings,
including cases involving SEPs, sequential infringement, regulatory uncertainty, and
unexpected exogenous events.
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